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Not surprisingly, the Bicentennial decade provoked a gaggle of 
new studies on The Federalist, the series of essays prepared by Alex-
ander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay to explain and de-
fend the proposed Constitution in its 1787-88 struggle for 
ratification.! What may be surprising, however, is the degree to 
which the themes that dominate these recent studies closely parallel 
contemporary political life. For example, one of the major ques-
tions in the early days of the Bush presidency is how far Bush will 
depart not just from the policies, but from the overall vision of 
America that animated the Reagan administration. Bush (or was it 
Peggy Noonan?) raised the question forcefully in his Inaugural Ad-
dress: Does America have a moral character? Or is it merely the 
locus for the play of freedom understood as self-interest, as many 
took Reaganism to have affirmed? As Bush put it: what is at stake 
is the question of the quality and character of American souls. And 
Bush, of course, was not the first president of recent times to raise 
this question: a crucial fulcrum of the Carter presidency was the 
diagnosis of "moral malaise," a symptom of that administration's 
own malaise, but also of this deeper current of concern over the 
moral quality of the polity. 
The recent studies of The Federalist pose this very question to 
the founding generation: what moral qualities beyond self-interest 
and prosperity did the framers take for granted or mean to impart 
to the new nation? The authors seem to believe that the answer to 
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this historical and exegetical question will bear in some way on our 
current situation. Tom West puts the point as incisively as one 
could wish: "Let us be clear: What the current scholarly debate is 
about is whether America is corrupt from the very start."2 The 
answer uniformly given by these scholars is "no"-and if not "cor-
rupt from the start" then either not corrupt now, or not beyond 
redemption now. 
On further reflection, it is probably not so remarkable to find 
this parallel between the scholarly studies and the concerns agitat-
ing political life: it was ever so. Take, for example, two earlier gi-
ants in Federalist studies, Charles Beard and Martin Diamond. 
Beard, the enfant terrible of American historians, found the foun-
ders guilty of anti-democratic class bias and self-interest in their 
constitution, at the same time that he praised their Federalist essays 
as an astute economic theory of politics more or less of the sort he 
himself endorsed.3 In retrospect, Beard's version of the founding 
was clearly in the service of the Progressive political agenda of the 
early twentieth century. The founder's Constitution, it was 
thought, stood in the way of political and economic reforms that the 
country required, and Beard's Economic Interpretation of the Con-
stitution was at once an explanation of why the Constitution was 
such a barrier to reform and a delegitimation of it in that (or any) 
role. 
Diamond belonged to an entirely different generation and 
spoke to a very different political agenda.4 By the late 1950s, the 
Beardian synthesis had been beaten about the head and shoulders 
by many scholars, who showed that Beard's correlation of the foun-
ders' economic interests and political actions didn't hold up.s 
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But important as the scholarly onslaught was in weakening 
Beard, equally important were changes in historical circumstances 
and the "felt necessities" of what America required by way of 
knowledge of the founding. Not delegitimating but relegitimating 
the American political regime was the order of the day in the post-
war world. The Federalist was welcomed less as the proto-Marxist 
tract Beard had made it, than as a source of a specifically American 
alternative to Marxism. According to Diamond, The Federalist did 
not endorse a Marxian idea of class-based politics, but instead "an-
ticipated and refuted Marxism. "6 Since the newest group of Feder-
alist studies all (in one way or another) take a Diamond-like reading 
as their chief point of departure, a fuller explanation of his position 
is in order. 
Diamond placed a large negative sign in front of almost every-
thing Beard had argued: the founders were not greedy self-seekers, 
but public-spirited leaders acting on a new theory of politics, itself 
derivative from modem political philosophy.7 They were convinced 
democrats, albeit sober ones, aware of the imperfections of democ-
racy.s As an expression of modem (as opposed to ancient) political 
philosophy, The Federalist was the bearer of a certain kind of polit-
ical realism: modem political philosophers purported to base their 
views and recommendations upon the character of "man as he actu-
ally is."9 "Man as he actually is" is self-interested and passion-
driven. That has implications for both the ends and means of poli-
tics. Not the high virtue or perfection of the classical tradition, but 
"a lowered political end, namely, human comfort and security" 
came into view as the goal of politics in The Federalist. to Instead of 
looking to virtue as the means to political ends, Americans followed 
the modem political philosophers like Machiavelli and John Locke 
in attempting to "rely largely instead upon shrewd institutional ar-
rangements of the powerful human passions and interests."'' Dia-
mond located the founders squarely within what David Hume 
called "the selfish system of morals" which attempted to trace all 
moral phenomena back to self-interest or egoism.12 The system es-
tablished by the Constitution was to produce good or just outcomes 
from morally indifferent or self-interested actions. In Diamond's 
6. M. DIAMOND, THE FOUNDING OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 73. 
7. Diamond, Ethics and Politics, supra note 4, at 82. 
8. DIAMOND, supra note 6, at 62-70; Democracy and The Federalist, passim; The 
Revolution of Sober Expectations in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THREE VIEWS 78-82 
(1975). 
9. Diamond, Ethics and Politics, supra note 4, at 82. 
10. /d. at 83. 
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hands The Federalist became the political equivalent of the 
Smithian market-a system operating through largely amoral 
mechanisms to produce beneficial but unintended consequences. 
The Federalist's approach to politics "smacked much of 'private 
vice, public good,' " concluded Diamond.t3 None of this was meant 
to depreciate The Federalist or the founders' constitutional order. 
The chief legacy of The Federalist was its theory of moderate, i.e. 
constitutional, democracy, achieved through the new low, but solid 
devices of self-interest. The American system did not aim high, but 
it allowed a decent common life. Compared to the various totalitar-
ian alternatives thrown up by modern politics, that appeared very 
attractive indeed. 
By the late 1970s the "felt necessities" had mutated again. 
More than a decade of intense challenge to the American political 
order on behalf of civil rights, anti-war, feminist, environmental and 
other causes produced new perspectives on American political life. 
Diamond's reading of The Federalist was called into question be-
cause the theory of the polity he uncovered did not seem to speak to 
present concerns. Hunger for a more fervidly moral dimension to 
American public life was abroad in the land-although people at 
various places on the political spectrum had very different ideas 
about the substance of that morality. 
The recent studies of The Federalist then, are both shaped by, 
and intended to shape, present American political life. Diverse as 
are the visions of The Federalist that emerge from the new studies, 
they all have in common the discovery of a text, of a constitutional 
order, of a founding impulse different from the mechanistic, self-
interested, passion-driven system Diamond had described. All 
agree that The Federalist contains a higher or more moral under-
standing of politics; all react against what they see as the morally 
objectionable and low, individualistic and selfish tone of The Feder-
alist as read by Diamond. 
In scholarly discussion often the most weighty issues take the 
most arcane or even pedantic forms. Here, much of the discussion 
revolves around what might appear to an outsider as a peripheral 
issue: who really influenced the founders most decisively? The old 
answer, which Diamond retained, was John Locke, the English lib-
eral philosopher who originated empiricism and gave the first major 
defense of proto-capitalism. Recent writers, with the exception of 
Thomas Pangle, challenge that view. 14 The competitors for Locke's 
13. Diamond, Ethics and Politics, supra note 4, at 93. 
14. T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM (1988). Cf J. DIGGINS, 
THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984). 
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place of honor are many: Christianity, the moral sense school of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume, the civic republicanism 
tradition, or even the ancient political philosophers. 
Garry Wills's Explai!ling America is one of the earliest and 
most influential statements of the new wave in Federalist studies. 
The contrast to Diamond is marked, although there is surely no 
return to Beard either. Instead of the ancient-modem categories 
which figured so prominently in Diamond's work, Wills deploys a 
distinction derived from Hume between selfish and social systems. 
The Federalist, says Wills, belongs altogether within the "social sys-
tem" as pioneered in the work of Francis Hutcheson, ripened by 
other thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, and matured in the 
thought of David Hume. Directly counter to Diamond's claim, 
Wills found "the classical zeal for republican virtue ... at the very 
heart of The Federalist." Is Following Hume, The Federalist neither 
builds on Lockean individualistic premises nor on purely selfish pas-
sions as channeled in institutions. Human beings, rather, are socia-
ble beings intended for society from the outset, as shown by their 
possession of a moral sense which establishes a natural ethical ca-
pacity. "The state of nature" is a great fiction; human beings al-
ways live in society.16 Wills rejects, therefore, Diamond's 
interpretation of Publius on both the ends and means of political 
life. The Federalist "claims . . . that public virtue is an absolute 
necessity for the existence of a republic ... . "11 \fills finds this 
version of the founders to be far more supportive of a communi tar-
ian vision of America, an America where the natural ties and con-
nections among human beings readily support a "kinder and 
gentler" nation. Somehow, a vision of community and polity in the 
minds of Hamilton and Madison seemingly justifies or even effectu-
ates a different kind of politics for us, one far more open to a liberal, 
redistributivist, and participatory agenda. 
Coming from the other side of the political spectrum is David 
Epstein's The Political Theory of the Federalist, which has some 
points of intersection with Wills, but for the most part veers off in 
other directions and responds to a somewhat different moral and 
political agenda. Epstein steps outside the Lockean or liberal ap-
proach to politics in his treatment of the theme of republicanism in 
The Federalist. He does not go as far as Wills and deny that the 
essays contain a major Lockean dimension. He claims, however, 
that in addition to the Lockean liberal commitment to securing in-
15. G. WILLS, supra note I, at 20. 
16. Id. at 15, 31, 54, 189-92. 
17. !d. at 187; cf id. at 192. 
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dividual rights, the founders were also committed to republican life 
as understood in the tradition of civic republicanism.ts That tradi-
tion has been well described as follows: 
Part Aristotle, part Cicero, part Machiavelli, civic humanism conceives of man as a 
political being whose realization of self occurs only through participation in public 
life, through active citizenship in a republic.l9 
According to Epstein, this republican life was not merely 
(although it was partly) valued by the founders because it served as 
a means to their liberal ends. Republicanism was also a vehicle of 
true nobility in the political universe of The Federalist and for a way 
and sphere of life-politics and the public-higher than the system 
of selfish passions contained in liberal markets or found in Dia-
mond's reading of The Federalist. Epstein finds the book rooted 
instead in "a psychology which understands the specifically polit-
ical, rather than economic, impulses of man."2o Political life stands 
as an ennobling end in itself, both for leaders and for people. Ep-
stein is less concerned with the communitarian than with the enno-
bling aspects of the older republicanism. 
Like other recent scholars Epstein seems genuinely pleased to 
discover a dimension of the seminal work of the American constitu-
tional order which transcends liberalism. Today, many people 
worry that American public life has atrophied to the point that the 
most political event we experience, the presidential election, has be-
come merely an extension of our most private acts of consumption; 
when candidates are marketed and voters act like busy shoppers; 
when our private lives seem almost entirely given over to the com-
fort-seeking pursuits Nietzsche vilified as those of "the last man." 
Many scholars see these results not as a merely fortuitous conjunc-
tion of forces, but as the natural working out of the original im-
pulses of Lockean liberalism. At such times evidence is more than 
welcome that the American tradition contains within it-right at its 
birth, even if as an unrealized seed-an alternative to this debased 
political fate. It is as though the authentication of these higher 
moral qualities by Hamilton and Madison guarantees their present 
and future existence for us. 
This gaggle of new approaches to The Federalist raises two dif-
ficult questions. First, is one or another of these different versions 
of a politics "beyond" Lockean liberalism in fact to be found in The 
Federalist? And second, what is the significance of the search, does 
it make sense? As is true of most difficult questions, the answer to 
18. D. EPSTEIN, supra note I, ch. 4. 
19. Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 630 (1982). 
20. EPSTEIN, supra note I, at 6. 
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the first is complex: both yes and no. As Charles Kesler says in his 
volume, the more recent interpretations show Diamond to have 
been "one-dimensional."21 The Federalist does contain much dis-
cussion of virtue and other moral notions; its authors do not seem 
to consider these as mere chimeras; they do seem to find a place for 
them in political life, both in terms of the ends and the means of 
politics. They do seem concerned with republicanism for reasons 
that go beyond its instrumental service to the liberal end of protect-
ing rights. As Epstein emphasizes, they relate the commitment to 
republicanism to the desire to vindicate the honor of human nature, 
and thus view politics as an honorable activity in its own right and 
human nature as itself honorable.22 They therefore do not embrace 
the Hobbesian view of human nature attributed to them by inter-
preters like Diamond. 
Yet these scholars go too far. Wills, for example, rightly sees 
the tracks of David Hume in The Federalist, but misinterprets the 
connection by overstating the continuity between Hume and the 
moral sense school, and exaggerating the distance between Hume 
and Locke. (Hume after all was a crucial link between Locke and 
Adam Smith.) Certainly when Wills finds that The Federalist 
"claims that public virtue is an absolute necessity for the existence 
of a republic ... ," he is imposing views on the text which the text 
will not support. In the famous Federalist No. 10, for example, 
Madison insisted that "neither moral nor religious notions can be 
relied on .... " In the equally well-known Federalist No. 51, 
Madison defended the Constitution's reliance on devices of self-in-
terest to check self-interest, ambition to check ambition, with the 
observation that: "It may be a reflection on human nature, that 
such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of govern-
ment. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflec-
tions on human nature? If men were angels, no government would 
be necessary." 
Similar difficulties plague Epstein's attempt to enable The Fed-
eralist's vision by placing it in a tradition which sees political life 
itself as the most characteristic expression of human dignity. Ep-
stein's interpretation runs afoul of features of their text (and their 
Constitution) of which he is himself aware: 
If the political liberty men have in popular government is important to them for its 
own sake ... , then there must be something about the exercise of political authority 
which men find satisfying. Yet the type of popular government recommended by 
21. Kesler, Federalist 10 and American Republicanism in SAVING THE REVOLUTION 
18 (1987). 
22. D. EPSTEIN, supra note I, at 119-20. 
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The Federalist is one in which the people do not themselves exercise political 
authority but merely elect particular men to exercise authority.23 
Indeed, The Federalist defended as a great good the exclusion of the 
people from direct involvement in government. The founders laid 
the theoretical and practical groundwork for the extremely large 
mass democracy of the twentieth century, and never once, to my 
knowledge, expressed regret over the loss of opportunities for polit-
ical life that this entails. At every turn they saw these apparent 
losses as gains. 
Typical of what might appear to be The Federalist's almost 
schizophrenic approach to the issue of virtue is Madison's Federal-
ist No. 57. That essay contains the statement most clearly support-
ive of the post-Diamond interpretations: "The aim of every 
political constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for rulers men 
who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the 
common good of the society." Yet after a few paragraphs of analy-
sis, Madison concluded that not "virtue," but "the situation" of the 
rulers must be looked to in order to attach them to "the common 
good." That was to be done via appeal to "motives of a more selfish 
nature." Perhaps every constitution ought to aim at virtue, but 
Madison did not believe it wise to act as if virtue were often 
achieved. Virtue is certainly not the center of The Federalist's 
political science. 
The founders seem to come very close to Hume on this vexed 
question of virtue in politics. He considered it a "just political 
maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave," yet he also 
thought it "strange, that a maxim should be true in politics which is 
false in fact. "24 The founders' retreat from morality was not based 
on moral skepticism, as might be the case today, but on an over-
whelming sense of virtue's political inefficacy. They had no doubts 
of the reality and content of virtue, but many doubts as to its relia-
bility. For the most part, they judged, it was prudent to look 
elsewhere. 
It seems fair to conclude, then, that the new scholarship is not 
viable. Their verdict against Diamond-"terribly one-dimen-
sional" -applies more or less to their own work. 
Now some would say that the problem lies in the project it-
self-the turn to The Federalist with an eye to finding something in 
it for us. But why else are we interested in these old books if they 
23. /d. at 97. 
24. Hume, Of the Independency of Parliament, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND 
LITERARY 42 (1973). 
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cannot tell us something about our questions? It is healthy and in 
any case inevitable that we be driven by our own questioning. 
But it is not inevitable that we be driven by our own answers. 
Useful, instructive, even entertaining as much of the recent scholar-
ship on The Federalist is, nonetheless it suffers from the vice of com-
ing to the text with current answers as well as current questions. 
That vice leads most of the recent scholars to slight the real point of 
value in The Federalist, the intensely wise treatment of the nature 
and operation of political institutions. That may not speak to the 
moral concerns which animate these studies, but we can learn much 
of great value about the operation of our political institutions from 
them, and even more by learning to think like them. 
Just one small example: the point is frequently made that the 
purpose of the separation of powers is to check and balance, to 
stalemate the exercise of power. But a richer appreciation of The 
Federalist would lead us to see what else the separation of powers is 
for. As Madison insisted in Federalist No. 3 7 the requirements of 
politics are many, complex, and in tension with each other. He 
gives as examples the needs for safety, stability and energy. A good 
political system must provide all three, but the institutional ar-
rangements which supply one counteract the others. The solution 
was a system of different institutions, composed and operating on 
different principles, each of which could make its special contribu-
tion to the whole by providing one or another of the requisite "de-
siderata" (to use a favorite term of Madison's). 
The sad fact is that the political science of The Federalist has 
been forgotten to a large degree. As Dennis Mahoney has shown, 
Progressivism was largely responsible for this.2s The recovery of 
The Federalist's political science would be a great step forward in 
our ability to think clearly about political institutions, and would 
counteract our tendency to excessive moralizing.26 Any number of 
issues, from the role of the presidency to the internal operations of 
Congress could be understood better if we went to school with 
Messrs. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. 
If one of their chief contributions would be to oppose our ten-
dency to moralize in the wrong times and places about politics, then 
the current spate of scholarship mostly focusses in the wrong place, 
and draws the wrong "lessons." This is not to say that the moral 
25. Mahoney, The Separation of Powers: A Constitutional Principle in Contemporary 
Perspective, in E PLURIBUS UNUM: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF GoVERNMENT 23 (S. Thurow ed. 1988). 
26. Cf Zucker!, Toward an Agenda for the Third Century, in E PLURIBUS UNUM, supra 
note 25, at 34. 
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concerns of our times or our scholars are illegitimate. It just turns 
out The Federalist is not the place where these are pursued in ways 
that can be very helpful to us, nor do these issues provide an ingress 
into The Federalist. Great as The Federalist is (and it is great-it is 
the only series of newspaper articles, after all, to deservedly earn a 
place among the "Great Books of the Western World"), nonetheless 
it does need to be supplemented. The Federalist was certainly not 
intended to be a comprehensive work of political philosophy. Its 
limited aim was to defend the Constitution before the country, its 
agenda to a large degree set by the criticisms, levelled against the 
Constitution by its opponents.27 There were, in other words, limits 
which even its authors would concede; there were, perhaps, other 
limits of which they were less aware. 
The Federalist can usefully be supplemented in a number of 
different ways. The moral foundations of democratic politics are 
more thoroughly explored, for instance, in Alexis de Toqueville's 
Democracy in America. The underlying but mostly unexplored 
moral presuppositions of The Federalist's political perspective are 
explored via the philosophy of John Locke in Thomas Pangle's ex-
cellent The Spirit of Modern Republicism. Within the writings of 
the framers themselves, other texts are richer fields for exploring the 
moral themes our scholars wish to pursue. For example, the found-
ing generation understood political right in terms of the philosophy 
of natural rights. This philosophy, Morton White irrefutably dem-
onstrates, was shared by the authors of The Federalist but not much 
explained or defended there.2s Other founding writings are better 
on this issue, especially those of Thomas Jefferson. 
So how does The Federalist answer George Bush's question 
about the moral quality of American political life? Hardly at all. 
The book certainly does not deny our aspirations to a moral poli-
tics, but its merits do not lie in its analyses of what this involves or 
in its prescriptions for how to get it. Indeed, if anything, The Feder-
alist is an extended set of reflections on how we might get by with 
relatively slight amounts of public virtue in leaders or people. Per-
haps its authors might say the lesson we should take from their 
book in our currently troubled world is: be not anxious. But we are 
a nation with a Puritan heritage, and a healthy if intermittent moral 
sensibility, so this is not a message we are likely often or lastingly to 
accept. Let us instead, then, draw a more modest conclusion. 
Where the authors of The Federalist focussed their attention, 
27. fURTWANGLER, THE AUTHORITY OF PUBLIUS (1984) shows some sensitivity to 
the limits of THE FEDERALIST. See ch. I. 
28. WHITE, supra note I, chs. 3, 11-13. 
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they were unsurpassable. But they did not address, much less an-
swer, every question we raise, and their writings surely do not con-
tain every one of our pet solutions to our present political ills. Yet 
if we pay them the right kind of attention, we will find there is 
much, if not everything, in it for us. 
